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Corruption Temptation
Guy-Uriel E. Charles*
In response to Professor Lawrence Lessig’s Jorde Lecture, I suggest
that corruption is not the proper conceptual vehicle for thinking
about the problems that Professor Lessig wants us to think about. I
argue that Professor Lessig’s real concern is that, for the vast
majority of citizens, wealth presents a significant barrier to political
participation in the funding of campaigns. Professor Lessig ought to
discuss the wealth problem directly. I conclude with three reasons
why the corruption temptation ought to be resisted.
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INTRODUCTION
When Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) of
1974, which amended the FECA of 1971, it had a number of objectives in
mind.1 First, it wanted to create a strong public financing model.2 FECA 1971
did not provide much in terms of public financing, and Congress was of the
view that a comprehensive public finance scheme was necessary to solve the
problem of campaign financing. Second, Congress also wanted to regulate both
the supply and demand of money.3 Congress thought it necessary to address
both the entry and exit of money directed toward federal political campaigns.
Third, Congress wanted to return the individual citizen to the center of the
political process and understood that the democratic citizen needed to regain

Copyright © 2014 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their
publications.
* Charles S. Rhyne Professor of Law, Duke Law School.
1. See, e.g., JAMES A. GARDNER & GUY-URIEL E. CHARLES, ELECTION LAW IN THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 643–49 (2012).
2. Id. at 643.
3. Id. at 643–49.
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control of the democratic process.4 Congress was animated by a strong and
distinctive understanding of democratic participation. Thus, Congress
articulated a vision of political equality in which political participation was a
normative good and the birthright of the citizen.
Congress’s multipronged approach to campaign financing was pushed to
the side following the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo,5 which
altered the way that we think and talk about the regulation of money as a form
of political participation. As a consequence of Buckley and its progeny, we
think about the harm that needs reforming primarily in terms of corruption and
the appearance of corruption.6 Relatedly, because we think about the problem
of campaign finance reform as corruption and its ghostly apparition, we also
think of the solution to the problem as the absence of corruption and its
appearance.
Buckley’s intervention (and that of the cases it spawned) has been
detrimental to the cause of campaign finance reform, and not simply for the
obvious reason that the Court dismembered Congress’s coherent reform effort.
Buckley has been detrimental in two ways:
First, by framing the issue of campaign financing in speech terms, as
opposed to, for example, political participation terms, Buckley has caused us to
think about campaign financing as a special problem of democratic politics
divorced from other challenges of democratic politics such as voting,
redistricting, voter identification requirements, voter registration requirements,
and so forth.
Second, by recognizing corruption and its pale shadow, the appearance of
corruption, as the only doctrinal justifications for reform, Buckley has caused us
to narrow the range of our discourse on campaign finance reform. We no longer
talk about the gamut of values that we would like to see reflected in a system of
campaign financing. To be taken seriously in this doctrinal debate, all of our
discourse must be articulated within the corruption framework, which causes us
to ignore other concerns that ought to be of interest when considering a system
of campaign financing. Buckley has created a corruption temptation that many
in the reform community have found irresistible.
Campaign finance reformers are thus beset by two related fundamental
challenges, both of which are largely a function of the way that the Supreme
Court has caused us all to think about these issues. The first challenge is that
reformers have a hard time identifying the problem they want fixed. Reformers
are hard-pressed to answer what ought to be a fairly simple question: What is
the problem with the private financing of campaigns that demands a regulatory
4. Id. at 644–45.
5. See 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
6. See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111
MICH. L. REV. 1385, 1388 (2013) (“The constitutional permissibility of most campaign finance cases
has turned on how the Court understands corruption.”).
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solution? Second, reformers have a hard time figuring out a solution. This is
not surprising, as it is difficult to devise a solution when one is unsure of the
problem.
Professor Lawrence Lessig’s essay on this issue, What an Originalist
Would Understand “Corruption” to Mean,7 is the latest to succumb to this
corruption temptation. His central thesis is that the way we fund elections today
is corrupt. Our campaign financing is corrupt, Lessig argues, because it “has
created a dependency that conflicts with the dependency intended by the
Constitution.”8 Working within the corruption framework, he aims to articulate
a conception of corruption that he calls “dependence corruption,” which he
intends to be distinct from quid pro quo corruption9 that the Court sketched out
in Buckley and refined in Citizens United v. FEC.10 His project is also intended
to be distinct from the equality concerns that the Court rejected most recently in
Citizens United v. FEC.11 Moreover, and perhaps most significantly, he aims to
articulate a conception of corruption that is rooted in originalism. This
conception of corruption is meant to appeal to the conservatives on the
Supreme Court because the conservatives are the crucial voting bloc on
campaign finance issues and are either committed originalists or sympathetic to
originalism.
In this Essay, I will use Lessig’s essay to suggest three reasons why the
corruption temptation ought to be resisted. First, we have surprisingly little
agreement on what corruption means.12 Corruption, as it turns out, is a very
slippery concept. (And switching from corruption to the appearance of
corruption does not provide greater clarity or guidance.) Outside of the narrow
quid pro quo context, corruption is, fundamentally, an unproductive way for us
to think about the problem of campaign finance. But we seem to be unable to
have a discussion about campaign finance that is not tethered to corruption.
Second, because we feel compelled by campaign finance doctrine to
reconfigure non-corruption justifications for regulating campaign financing
within the corruption framework, our arguments are strained, less persuasive,
and less coherent than they would otherwise be if we simply focused on the
issues that we really want to talk about. When reformers make strained
7. Lawrence Lessig, What an Originalist Would Understand “Corruption” to Mean, 102
CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2014).
8. Id. at 5.
9. Id. at 7 (“An institution can be corrupt even if every individual within it is not. Thus, to say
that Congress is corrupt is not necessarily to say that any member of Congress is also corrupt. They
may be, or they may not be; the two concepts are distinct. The proof of one does not entail the proof of
the other.”).
10. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
11. As first expressed in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975), the Court has rejected the idea
that the government can “mute the voices of affluent persons and groups in the election process and
thereby to equalize the relative ability of all citizens to affect the outcome of elections.” Id. at 25–26.
12. See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 6, at 1391–1402 (articulating multiple definitions of
corruption).
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corruption arguments they are not only arguing on alien turf but they are also
unlikely to address fundamental conceptual challenges, which takes away from
the persuasiveness of their arguments.
Third, by giving in to the corruption temptation, reformers have failed to
develop robust theories of harm in campaign finance. In particular, reformers
have failed to articulate an alternative framework that both challenges the
fundamental conceptual underpinnings of the Court’s deregulatory agenda and
advances an attractive alternative to that agenda. Buckley has placed reformers
into a bind from which they are having a hard time escaping.
There are two ways forward for the reform agenda. One is that the
political composition of the Court changes and the doctrinal straightjacket
loosens. This possibility would require reformers to pay attention assiduously
to campaign finance doctrine so as to limit the deregulatory impulse or agenda
of the current Court.13 Consistent with that possibility, the goal of the reform
community could be to attempt to minimize its losses and bide its time in the
hope and anticipation that more liberal Justices will replace those more
conservative on campaign finance reform.
A second possibility is to attempt to change the terms of the debate
altogether. This option would require reformers to think outside of the Buckley
straightjacket. For example, instead of thinking about the role of money in
politics strictly in First Amendment terms and making equality-based
countervailing arguments within the language of the First Amendment,
reformers might reframe campaign finance issues in political participation
terms more broadly. Instead of thinking about corruption as the problem,
reformers might begin to think about more structural solutions to the problem,
such as strengthening the role of political parties, or focusing more concretely
on the way that the never-ending quest to raise more money affects the
fiduciary relationship between the representative and the voter.
Unfortunately, Lessig’s project is neither fish nor fowl. It is not a doctrinal
project nor is it a project that attempts to change the terms of the debate in
language different from the doctrinal framework. As I understand it, it is a
project that attempts to change the terms of the debate within the current
doctrinal framework.
Admittedly, there is much to like about Lessig’s overall project. It is
engaging, accessible, and important. In particular, his book Republic, Lost is
magisterial.14 Lessig has brought widespread attention to the problem of
campaign finance in a way that no other legal academic has. For that alone he is
to be commended.

See infra text accompanying notes 46–49.
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A
PLAN TO STOP IT (2011).
13.
14.

02-Charles (Do Not Delete)

2014]

1/16/2014 10:02 AM

CORRUPTION TEMPTATION

29

But the project also suffers from some flaws. In particular, it lacks
conceptual precision. As I will show, though Lessig purports to provide us with
a singular definition of “dependence corruption,” he has in fact provided us
with at least three. And as I argue, none of the three definitions is really about
corruption, dependence or otherwise. Moreover, Lessig’s project is not at its
best when it tries to fit within the narrow doctrinal space that the Court has left
us to talk about campaign financing. Rather, it is at its best when it rejects the
Court’s framework altogether and gets us to imagine different starting
premises, different paths, and alternative endings. Professor Lessig’s project
would be more compelling if he exercised these options more often than he has.
This Essay makes the point that corruption is not the proper conceptual
vehicle for thinking about the problems that Lessig wants us to think about.
Part I discusses Lessig’s concept of “dependence corruption” and critiques a
specific type of “dependence corruption.” Part II argues that Lessig’s real
concern is that the private financing of campaigns makes wealth a prerequisite
to political participation. Because few citizens are wealthy enough to be able to
make political contributions and expenditures, private financing of campaigns
is tantamount to the government passing a law that allows only certain citizens
to make political contributions and expenditures. I argue here that Lessig’s real
target is not so much corruption as it is private financing itself, which presents
an overwhelming barrier for the vast majority of citizens to political
participation in the funding of campaigns.
I.

WHAT IS “DEPENDENCE CORRUPTION”?
The central conceptual innovation of Lessig’s work in the area of
campaign finance is the concept of “dependence corruption.” Lessig argues that
Congress is corrupt because it is more dependent upon a small group of funders
than it is on “the people alone.”15 Professor Lessig uses the allegory of
Lesterland to explain this concept of “dependence corruption.” Lesterland has
two kinds of citizens: a small group of people called Lesters and everyone else.
Lesterland also has two elections: a qualifying election, similar to a primary, in
which only the Lesters are allowed to vote, and a regular election in which
everyone else participates. In order for a candidate to participate in the general
election, she must first do well in the Lester election.
For Lessig, Lesterland is obviously the United States. Lessig maintains
that like Lesterland, the United States in effect holds two elections: a qualifying
election, or money election, in which a very small group of funders participate,
and then a general election or voting election in which the people get to vote.16
The money election “produces a subtle, perhaps camouflaged bending to keep
15.
16.

Lessig, supra note 7, at 7.
Id. at 2–3.
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the funders in the money election[] happy.”17 This “bending” creates a
“conflict” because the Framers intended Congress to be “dependent on the
people alone.”18 Instead of being dependent on the people alone, Congress has
become dependent on the plutocrats. This dependence creates the “corruption”
of “dependence corruption.”19
Lessig purports to offer only one definition of “dependence corruption,”
but he actually articulates three different conceptions of “dependence
corruption.” Under the first articulation, “dependence corruption” is the failure
of Congress to be dependent on the people alone. Here the problem is that
Congress is dependent upon a group of individuals that are not “the people.”
Under a second definition, “dependence corruption” is the way that legislators
bend their views to keep the funders happy. Legislators “learn to talk about the
issues the funders care about; they spend very little time talking about the
issues most Americans care about.”20 Here the problem is not the lack of
dependence upon the people but the bending. Under the third articulation, the
corruption problem is the fact that Congress is dependent upon a minority of
the people and not the whole people.
In this Part, I will examine the first articulation of “dependence
corruption”: the failure of legislators to be dependent on the people alone.21 I
will suggest that under this understanding of “dependence corruption,”
“dependence corruption” is not a problem in the United States today. The
question raised by this conception of “dependence corruption” is who the
“people” are. Or, put differently, are the Lesters also “the people”? If the
Lesters are also “the people” then there is no such thing as this form of
“dependence corruption.”
Because “dependence corruption” is only understood as a stylized
definition—the type of corruption that is of concern to Professor Lessig is, as a
matter of definition, the absence of exclusive dependence on the people22—it is
critical that we understand who the people are and who the people are not.
Without an understanding of the people, we cannot understand what
“dependence corruption” is. On this point, Professor Lessig’s expositions are
less than helpful.
In Lesterland it is very clear who are the “people” and who are the
plutocrats. Professor Lessig writes that in Lesterland “only Lesters get to vote”

17. Id. at 4.
18. See id. Part II.
19. Id. at 9 (To avoid corruption, “an institution must avoid an improper dependence.”).
20. Id. at 4.
21. I address the other two articulations in the remainder of the Essay.
22. Lessig, supra note 7, at 14 n.50 (“‘Dependence corruption’ is ‘corruption’ because it
reflects an improper, as in unintended, dependence. The impropriety is the corruption. The harm that
corruption causes is the reason we might want to remedy it. But the harm—either to equality norms, or
to deliberation—is not the corruption.”).

02-Charles (Do Not Delete)

2014]

1/16/2014 10:02 AM

CORRUPTION TEMPTATION

31

in the Lester election.23 Though Professor Lessig is not crystal clear on this
point, he seems to imply rather strongly that as a matter of law, only Lesters
have a right to participate in the Lester election. Lesterland appears to have a
clear understanding of who “the people” are—everyone not named Lester—and
the people are by law prohibited from participating in an important qualifying
election.
In certain periods of American history, the United States very much
resembled Lesterland. Certainly at the Founding, and at least until the
ratification of the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments (and
arguably until the passage of the Voting Rights Act), it was very clear that “the
people” did not include black people or women, who were formally denied the
right to vote. The Lesters were white men and sometimes only propertied white
men. The United States was, during those periods, ruled by Lesters.24
But this is not the case in the United States today, and it is certainly not
the case with campaign financing. Whereas in Lesterland everyone but Lesters
are prohibited from participating in the Lester election, as a matter of law no
individual citizen is denied the right to contribute to a candidate in the United
States.
Lessig elides this distinction by noting that the United States is like
Lesterland because “it, too, effectively has two elections.”25 That adverb,
“effectively,” is carrying a lot of conceptual weight, too much perhaps.26 As
Lessig knows, there is a significant difference between state action that restricts
political participation to a subset of citizens (or Lesters) and state action that
permits all citizens to participate though only a subset of them do in fact
participate.
This is why Lessig’s reliance on the “White Primary Cases” to support his
point is unavailing. The White Primary Cases, in particular Terry v. Adams,27
rely upon some notion of state action, public function, or common carrier
rationale. Justice Black’s plurality opinion in Terry seemed to rely on the

23. Id. at 3.
24. As Bruce Cain notes, election law, especially the area of political participation, is an odd
place to anchor originalist claims. See Bruce E. Cain, Is “Dependence Corruption” the Solution to
America’s Campaign Finance Problems?, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 37 (2014). As Cain remarks:
It is unclear, to begin with, how sincere and prominent the Founders’ concerns about
aristocratic dominance actually were. Their decision to restrict the vote is just as easily
explained by outright prejudice against women and minorities, the desire to retain power,
fear of differing interests, or any number of other common reasons for political
discrimination.
Id. at 40.
25. Lessig, supra note 7, at 3.
26. The noun “elections” is also doing a lot of conceptual work. Are political contributions like
elections? Perhaps they are. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW
PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002). But we might be served with an explicit defense of the
analogy.
27. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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theory that the state has delegated to a private entity an essential public
function, the running of elections, as a justification for finding state action.28
As a matter of law, everyone is entitled to contribute to the financing of
elections. And politicians welcome almost all legal political contributions, big
or small. Everyone is potentially a Lester. In the United States, the funders are
potentially coterminous with the people.29 If this point is correct, it also means
that the Lesters are included in “the people.”30 When we rely on the Lesters (or
the funders), we are not relying upon a foreign electorate such as Canadians or
Mexicans, (or even more basically a fictional entity such as a corporation); we
are relying upon a subset of the American electorate—perhaps a small subset,
but a subset nonetheless. Thus, the problem of campaign financing cannot be
that Congress is not ultimately dependent on the people alone; the problem
must be that Congress is dependent on some of the people (the small group of
people who choose to participate or find it easier to participate) more than it is
dependent on some of the other people (the large group who do not). And if
Lesters are people too, then “dependence corruption,” because it is a stylized
definitional project, is no longer corruption, at least under this articulation.
II.

WEALTH AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Consider here the other two articulations of “dependence corruption.”
Sometimes Professor Lessig defines “dependence corruption” as the failure of
Congress to be dependent on the people alone, which I have suggested above is
not really about corruption at all since legislators, except when they selffinance, are always dependent at least upon some of the people for financing
their campaigns. Sometimes Lessig is concerned with the “subtle, understated,
perhaps camouflaged bending [by the legislators] to keep the Lesters happy.”31
Lessig recounts a story from former Senator Evan Bayh who described how
this “corruption” works. In anticipation of support or attack from super PACs,
elected officials “conform[] [their] behavior to the standards set by the super
PAC.” 32 As Bayh described it, “without even spending a dollar, the super PAC
achieves its objective: bending congressmen to its program.”33

28. Id. at 469 (“For a state to permit such a duplication of its election processes is to permit a
flagrant abuse of those processes to defeat the very purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment. . . . It
violates the Fifteenth Amendment for a state, by such circumvention, to permit within its borders the
use of any device that produces an equivalent of the prohibited election.”).
29. See also Cain, supra note 24, at 41–42 (making a similar point).
30. See also Richard L. Hasen, Is “Dependence Corruption” Distinct from a Political Equality
Argument for Campaign Finance Laws?: A Reply to Professor Lessig (U.C. Irvine Law Sch., Research
Paper No. 2013-94), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2220851.
31. Lessig, supra note 7, at 3.
32. Id. at 22 (quoting LAWRENCE LESSIG, ONE WAY FORWARD 67–68 (2012)).
33. Id.
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Here Lessig is talking about the responsiveness of public officials to their
constituents. The point seems to be that legislators will adopt ideological
positions in order to attract or keep contributors. This bending will make
legislators differentially responsive, and thus dependent upon large
contributors. As Rick Hasen has argued however, the Court has precluded the
government from regulating campaign financing on the basis that legislators
will respond differentially to large contributors.34 This articulation is the closest
Lessig comes, in my view, to making an equality argument, an argument that
all voters ought to have equal impact on the political process or that political
actors ought to respond equally to all voters. Because Lessig is uninterested in
equality-based arguments, this cannot be what he means by “dependence
corruption.”
At other times Lessig defines “dependence corruption” as Congress’s
dependence upon some of the people as opposed to the whole people. Lessig
writes that the “focus of the corruption that I am describing in this Essay [is] a
system in which a tiny proportion of citizens are ‘the funders’ within the money
election.”35 Elsewhere, Lessig writes, “a dependence upon ‘the funders,’ when
those funders constitute such a tiny slice of a concentrated interest, is also
‘dependence corruption.’”36 “Dependence corruption” here means corruption as
a function of dependence upon some of the people and not all of the people.
As I will suggest in the remainder of this Part, this articulation of
“dependence corruption” is really best articulated as a problem of political
participation and not a problem of corruption. The crucial problem is not that
legislators are dependent upon a minority of the people—that is the symptom.
The problem is that not enough of the people participate as funders in
democratic politics.
Before pursuing this further, consider an illustrative analogy. One might
say that an individual, who routinely cannot fall asleep without the assistance
of a sleep aid, is dependent upon the sleep aid. If asked to identify this
individual’s problem one could focus on the sleep aid. One could get rid of the
sleep aid, but that would not get at the root of the problem, as the dependence
upon the sleep aid is simply the evident manifestation of an underlying
problem. The root cause is not the sleep aid but the fact that the individual has
some problem that is preventing her from sleeping properly. Or to put it
differently, to cure improper dependence on the sleep aid, one must first deal
with the underlying problem that is preventing this individual from falling
asleep.
By focusing on dependence, Lessig has identified the evident
manifestation of the underlying problem. But he has not identified the root

34.
35.
36.

See Hasen, supra note 30, at 15.
Lessig, supra note 7, at 18.
Id.
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cause or causes of the problem. The root causes of the problem are the
structural and economic barriers that preclude a vast majority of citizens from
participating in politics or from financing elections.37 From this perspective, the
question then is how to get more people to participate in funding democratic
politics.
I agree with Lessig that this issue need not be stated as an equality
problem. To the extent that Lessig is not concerned with assuring that citizens
have equal influence as funders, then Lessig is not open to the equality charge.
But I also think it is odd for Lessig to think about this as a corruption problem.
Lessig’s apparent concern is that the state has designed a system of campaign
financing that is open only to a certain group of people. The state has
predetermined that only a certain group of people can participate in the funding
of campaigns. This is a political participation problem that raises similar speech
issues as were raised by, for example, Citizens United, where the state excluded
corporations from participating in the financing of campaigns.
Viewed in this way, Lessig’s analogy of a system of private funding to the
white primary makes sense. Lessig writes: “the exclusion of blacks from the
primary could plainly be said to be a corruption of ‘dependence on the people
alone.’”38 This is because the white primary created a “regime that filters
choices on the basis of whether someone is white or black” and “not every
citizen could be a member of the filtering class. . . . [B]lacks cannot be
white.”39 Lessig is concerned that the state has created a barrier for political
participation (wealth) that some citizens will never be able to overcome. In the
same way that blacks cannot be white, a significant number of non-funders
cannot be funders. Non-funders cannot be funders not because non-funders do
not wish to be funders or are uninterested in being funders, but because they do
not have the financial resources that would enable them to participate as
funders. Lessig explains that in a private system of campaign financing “[o]nly
a tiny proportion of ‘the people’ could afford the funding necessary to become
‘a funder.’”40 Consequently, a system of private financing is a wealth
classification that makes wealth a prerequisite to political participation. As
Lessig writes later in his essay:
We all could be Democrats, or Republicans. There’s nothing logical or
practical that bars us from a Democratic or Republican primary. But
we could not all be the relevant “funders,” for to qualify for that status

37. Spencer Overton has written very eloquently and, in my view, quite persuasively about this
problem. See Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 73 (2004). He also argues that reformers need to focus much less on corruption and
more on participation.
38. Lessig, supra note 7, at 17.
39. Id. at 17–18.
40. Id. at 18.

02-Charles (Do Not Delete)

2014]

1/16/2014 10:02 AM

CORRUPTION TEMPTATION

35

requires a commitment of resources significantly beyond the reach of
the vast majority of electors.41
Conceptually, Professor Lessig could use the White Primary Cases in one
of two ways. First, Lessig might argue that given insuperable wealth
inequalities, allowing private financing to remain as essentially the only way to
finance campaigns is tantamount to a state law restricting political participation
to the wealthy. If he followed this line of logic, Lessig would eschew
arguments about corruption and focus more directly on the importance of
campaign financing and why that system should not be left to the wealthy.
Alternatively, Professor Lessig might be interested in arguing that the financing
of elections is a non-delegable state function. In what ways is campaign
financing like an election? To what extent is campaign financing an inherent
state function? Is this a function that is delegable to private parties? Does
allowing the wealthy to finance campaigns equal a poll tax in violation of the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment?42
If Lessig’s real concern is that financing elections is a non-delegable state
function, which seems to me the articulation that most powerfully and
coherently presents his project, it is certainly not an argument about equality. It
is much more profound and interesting than the distracting debates about
equality. Lessig is inviting us to think about campaign financing as implicating
basic rights of political participation. Put in different terms, campaign financing
is not like the one-person, one-vote reapportionment cases that raised issues of
vote dilution and voting equality. Campaign financing is like the participation
cases, cases in which the state denied a class of people the right to participate.
These include cases such as Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,43
which struck down Virginia’s poll tax on the ground that wealth was not
relevant to a citizen’s ability to participate in the political process; Gomillion v.
Lightfoot,44 which held unconstitutional Tuskegee’s racial gerrymandering
ordinance that removed almost all of the black citizens from the city; and
Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15,45 which invalidated a New York
ordinance that limited voting in school board elections to residents who own
property in the district or have children in the local schools.
CONCLUSION
Professor Lessig’s project is much more interesting than distracting
debates about corruption and dependence. The problem is not dependence;
41. Id. at 20.
42. For a project consistent with this approach, see Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou,
Canonizing the Civil Rights Revolution: The People and the Poll Tax, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 63 (2009);
see also Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (concluding that “wealth or fee
paying has . . . no relation to voting qualifications”).
43. 383 U.S. 663.
44. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
45. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
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dependence is the symptom. The problem is private financing itself—or wealth
as a prerequisite, an insuperable barrier, to political participation. To put the
point in Lessig’s terms, to cure improper dependence one must alter, if not
eliminate, the system of private financing.
Lessig’s project seems to be caught between an attempt to fit his concerns
with the current doctrinal framework and an attempt to upend the Buckley
paradigm. I am not optimistic that any campaign finance reform project can be
successful within the current doctrinal framework. The current Court is in the
process of dismantling each element of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1974. Expenditure limitations are completely gone.46 Public financing has been
severely undermined both as a matter of case law and as matter of politics.47
SpeechNow has struck a blow against contribution limits to expenditure-only
PACs.48 The Court is about to hear a case challenging aggregate contribution
limits.49 The political battle is now about disclosure, and we have not seen the
last of the litigation over the constitutionality of corporate contribution bans.
The reform project is decisively on the defensive. Reformers cannot hope to
reverse the tide if they are battling within the terms of the current doctrinal
framework.
Lessig’s project can present a different paradigm for reformers. Once
understood in participation terms, Lessig’s project is much more subversive
than even he is perhaps willing to admit. Lessig presents the doctrinal
implications of his project as exceedingly modest, a reversal of SpeechNow and
a justification for statutory bans on aggregate contribution limits.50
But at the very least, Lessig could and does present an important public
policy case for the public financing of campaigns. His work could help us
better understand why the financing of campaigns is a public good and why we
should be wary of entrusting that public good to the oligarchs. Lessig can call
this “dependence corruption,” but the Republic might be less lost if he made a
full-throated case for a system of political participation that is not limited by
wealth.

46. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1975).
47. See, e.g., Arizona Free Enter. Clubs’ Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806
(2011).
48. See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
49. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 133 S. Ct. 1242 (2013) (mem.) (noting probable jurisdiction).
50. Lessig, supra note 7, at 20–21.

